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Toward a Glossary of Self-related
Terms
Alain Morin*
Department of Psychology, Mount Royal University, Calgary, AB, Canada
Some scholars have noted that an impressive number of self-related terms have been
gradually introduced in the scientific literature. Several of these terms are either ill-defined
or synonymous, creating confusion, and redundancy. In an effort to minimize this
problem, I present a novel and systematic way of looking at possible relations between
several key self-terms. I also propose a tentative classification scheme of self-terms
as follows: (1) basic terms related to the overall process of self-perception (e.g., self-
awareness), (2) non self-terms that are importantly associated to some other self-terms
(e.g., consciousness and Theory of Mind), (3) processes related to the executive self and
involving agency, volition, and self-control (e.g., self-regulation), and (4) self-views, that
is, the content and feelings about the self (e.g., self-esteem). Three additional categories
not discussed in this paper are self-biases, reactions to the self, and interpersonal style.
Arguably unambiguous definitions for some of the most important and frequently used
self-terms are suggested. These are presented in tables meant for the reader to search
for definitions as well as related terms.
Keywords: self-reflection, mindfulness, mental time travel, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-concept, Theory-of-
Mind, self-regulation
INTRODUCTION
Mark Leary offered the following observation in his Editorial for a special issue on “What Is the
Self?” in Self and Identity (2004, pp. 2–3):
“... perhaps the field will move slowly to embrace a set of precise, clear, and distinct terms for each of the
phenomena that we study under the self and identity umbrella... Whatever terms one uses, providing
clear and precise definitions will also help to promote communication and minimize confusion.”
Indeed, definition confusion abounds in the field, as exemplified by the interchangeable use
of terms such as “extended self ”, “meta-representational/conceptual self-consciousness”, and
“reflective/recursive/meta-consciousness” to designate self-awareness (Morin, 2006). Although
Leary himself and others (e.g., Trapnell and Campbell, 1999; Leary and Tangney, 2003) have
attempted to define and classify multiple self-related terms, close inspection of these efforts reveals
that (a) they are only partial, that is, they leave out many self-terms undefined, (2) their proposed
taxonomy systems are arguably limited and could be expanded, and (3) they neglect to discuss
how various self-terms are conceptually and empirically connected. The present paper addresses
these limitations by putting forward a broader and more systematic glossary of self-related terms
which includes a consideration of how some key self-terms relate to one another. Its main goal is
to organize many self-terms (and related ones) into a comprehensive and logical system in order to
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TABLE 1 | Basic terms pertaining to general self-perception.
Term Related terms Definition
Self • Person
• Personality
• Identity
• Character
What distinguishes oneself from others; all imaginable private and public aspects making up
who a person is (Morin, 2006)—e.g., thoughts, emotions, goals, values, sensations, memories,
traits, attitudes, physical attributes, appearance, behaviors, skills.
Self-perception See all related terms within
Table 1
Overall process of self-awareness, self-knowledge acquisition and self-concept formation; an
awareness of the characteristics that constitute one’s self (Self-perception, 2016).
Self-variable • Self-information Any process, information or experience related to the self (Ritsner and Susser, 2004); any
aspects of the self that can be apprehended through self-awareness (Morin, 2011).• Self-representation
• Self-schema
• Self-knowledge
• Self-characteristic
Self-schema Specific (organized) unit of self-information; small conclusion about the self; cognitive
generalization about the self (Markus, 1977).
Self-relevance Self-referential Any information that refers to, is relevant to, the self (Shih et al., 2002).
Self-awareness • Self-directed attention
• Self-focus
Capacity to become the object of one’s own attention; to focus one’s attention inward toward
the self (Duval and Wicklund, 1972; Silvia and Duval, 2001); to actively identify, process, and
store information about the self (Morin, 2011).• Self-examination
• Self-observation
• Introspection
• Meta-awareness
• Self-consciousness
• Self-reflection
• Mindfulness
Self-consciousness See self-awareness
synonyms above
Consistent tendency (trait) to direct attention inward more or less often; also refers to
self-awareness with a social evaluation component (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
Self-analysis • Psychotherapy
• Psychoanalysis
Systematic self-examination in a psychotherapeutic context, with a psychoanalytic connotation
(Self-analysis, 2016).
Self-reflection • Self-awareness
• Self-consciousness
• Self-observation
• Mindfulness
Active cognitive act of examining the self; self-focus motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest
in the self; intellectual self-attentiveness; healthy form of self-focus (Trapnell and Campbell,
1999; Takano and Tanno, 2009).
Self-rumination Self-absorption Negative, chronic, and persistent self-focus motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices
to the self; neurotic self-attentiveness (see previous term for references).
Self-recognition • Self-directed behavior
• Mirror self-recognition
• Mark/rouge test
Self-directed behaviors emitted in front of a mirror; correctly identifying the image of self as self
(Gallup, 1968).
Self-knowledge Organized set of accurate self-information; realistic self-concept; accurate introspection about
one’s own self (Gibbons, 1983; Carlson, 2013; Wilson, 2009).
make more sense of what currently looks remarkably chaotic.
Like any taxonomy system it is not perfect (e.g., possibly
incomplete) but hopefully acts as a preliminary effort in the right
direction.
Leary (2004) establishes a distinction between three types of
self-related processes: (a) processes involved in reflexivity and
self-awareness, (b) the knowledge, beliefs, and feelings people
have about themselves, and (c) processes involved in agency and
self-regulation. While this initial classification system is certainly
helpful, I suggest that it can be improved as follows (see Morin
and Clements, 2015): (1) basic terms related to the overall process
of self-perception (e.g., self-awareness, self-reflection), (2) non
self-terms that are importantly related to various key self-terms,
such as consciousness and Theory-of-Mind, (3) self-processes
pertaining to the executive self and involving agency, volition,
and self-control, like self-talk and self-regulation, (4) self-views,
that is, the content and feelings about the self (e.g., self-esteem,
self-efficacy), (5) self-biases used mainly to protect the self, such
as self-enhancement and self-deception, (6) reactions to the self,
such as self-compassion and self-blame, and (7) interpersonal
style, such as self-confident and self-effacing. The present paper
exclusively focuses on the four first categories for length purposes;
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TABLE 2 | Non-self-terms associated with various key self-related terms.
Term Related terms Definition
Consciousness • Awareness
• Wakefulness
To focus attention outward toward the environment; opposite of unconsciousness
(Natsoulas, 1996).
Metacognition • Self-awareness
• Meta-awareness
• Decentering
• Cognitive distancing
• Mindfulness
• Introspection
Being aware of one’s own thought processes (Bernstein et al., 2015).
Introspection • Self-reflection
• Self-awareness
• Metacognition
The examination of one’s own conscious thoughts and feelings (Schultz and Schultz, 2012).
Mindfulness • Self-reflection
• Mindedness
Non-evaluative, non-elaborative attention to one’s current experience (Carlson, 2013).
Autobiography • Mental time travel
• Autonoetic consciousness
• Episodic memory
Recollection of one’s own past experiences (Conway, 2005).
Prospection • Mental time travel
• Autonoetic consciousness
• Future oriented thinking
• Episodic future thought
• Simulation
• Projection
Ability to simulate personal future episodes (Szpunar et al., 2016).
Death awareness Knowledge that one will unavoidably die; presupposes self-awareness (Gallup, 1998).
Theory-of-Mind • Inferring mental states
• Mentalizing
• Intentional stance
Thinking about others’ mental states (e.g., needs, thoughts, desires, emotions) (Frith and
Frith, 2003).
a second, independent, article will discuss the remaining three
categories.
Obviously, some self-related terms fit into more than one
category: to illustrate, self-knowledge can be understood both as a
basic self-perception unit (category 1) and as a self-view (category
4). Also, note that the above taxonomy does incorporate Leary’s
original classification system: his self-reflection processes (a) are
included in the “basic terms” category (1); his self-knowledge,
beliefs, and feelings contents (b) mostly refers to the “self-views”
group (3), and his self-regulatory processes (c) are captured
by the “executive self ” category (2). Note that the purpose of
category 2 is to discuss terms that are literally non-self terms.
All other tables/categories present "genuine" self-terms such as
self-knowledge, self-esteem, self-recognition, etc.
BASIC TERMS RELATED TO
SELF-PERCEPTION
Table 1 presents definitions (and in some cases conceptually
related terms) of multiple basic terms associated with the overall
process of self-perception. To summarize, “self ”, which contains
all imaginable physical and psychological (e.g., cognitive,
affective, motivational, social) characteristics that make a person
unique and different from others, represents the most important
(and frequently used) umbrella term related to all self-terms
to be discussed here. “Self-perception” refers to the overall
process of getting access to “self-variables”, including specific
self-characteristics such as being tall, habitual behaviors such
as being on time for work, and more global and stable
conclusions about the self (“self-schemas”), such as being
punctual or lazy. “Self-awareness” can be construed as being the
most fundamental self-perceptual process of directing attention
inward toward the self (Duval and Wicklund, 1972) and
actively identifying, processing, and storing information about
the self (Morin, in press). It is important to note that an
organism can possess a self without knowing about it. That
is, one can be effectively processing information about the
external environment (“consciousness”; see next section) in an
entirely unique and personal way (“self ”) without being self-
aware.
Typically, self-awareness is seen as a transient and situational
state induced by environmental experiences (e.g., self-focusing
stimuli like mirrors and cameras; Buss, 1980; Davies, 2005). In
contrast, “self-consciousness” designates a more permanent
personality-like trait supposedly unaffected by external
circumstances. It represents a more or less frequent tendency to
focus attention on the self (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier and
Carver, 1985). Self-awareness can further be divided into two
components: “self-reflection” and “self-rumination” (Trapnell
and Campbell, 1999). Self-reflection represents a healthy,
non-evaluative form of self-attentiveness, where the person
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TABLE 3 | Self-processes used by the self as an executive agent.
Term Related terms Definition
Self-regulation • Self-control
• Self-improvement
• Free will
• Volition
• Agency
Altering one’s behavior, resisting temptation, changing one’s mood,
selecting a response from various options, filtering irrelevant information
(Baumeister and Vohs, 2007).
Self-agency • Self-determination
• Autonomy
Subjective awareness that one is initiating, executing, and controlling
one’s own volitional actions in the world (Jeannerod, 2003).
Self-discipline Self-control The actual act of doing things that increase the likelihood of successful
self-regulation (Self-discipline, 2016).
Self-talk • Inner speech
• Private speech
• Self-directed speech
• Subvocal/covert/acommunicative speech
• Auditory imagery
• Speech-for-self
• Propositional thought
• Self-verbalizations
• Internal dialog/monolog
• Sub-vocalizations
• Self-statements
• Silent verbal thinking
Talking to oneself either silently or aloud (Morin, 2012).
Self-description Non-evaluative list of self-aspects (Higgins, 1996).
Self-evaluation Self-assessment Comparison between real and ideal selves (Higgins, 1987; Sedikides,
1993).
Self-presentation • Self-monitoring
• Self-management
• Impression formation
Manipulating the impression one makes on others (Martin and Leary,
1999).
Self-monitoring • Self-affirmation
• Self-promotion
Actual active process of self-management; careful self-focus aimed at
making a good impression (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986).
Self-disclosure Openness Willingness to open up to others and share self-information (Cozby,
1973).
Self-actualization Actualization Realization or fulfillment of one’s talents and potentialities (Maslow,
1962).
enjoys learning new things about the self in order to increase
self-understanding and improve the self (“self-regulation”). This
greatly resembles “mindfulness”, defined as a non-evaluative,
non-elaborative attention to one’s current experience (Carlson,
2013), which will be discussed below. On the other hand, the
self-ruminative person gets trapped in a circular, repetitive,
negative, and judgmental cycle of anxiety-ridden self-focus that
creates a state of self-absorption (Mor and Winquist, 2002). In
that state the person becomes excessively self-centered, which
negatively impacts her interest in, and compassion for, others
[impeded “Theory-of-Mind” (ToM); Joireman et al., 2002;
Joireman, 2004].
One particularly contentious issue is the meaning of self-
recognition: while some argue that recognizing oneself in a
mirror (or on a computer screen) signifies that one is fully self-
aware and can engage in ToM (Gallup, 1985; Keenan et al.,
2003), others claim that self-recognition simply rests on bodily
self-awareness and does not imply access to one’s or others’
mental states (Morin, 2010; Brandl, 2016; Saidel, 2016).
RELATED NON-SELF-TERMS
Table 2 presents definitions of some non-self-terms that
are nonetheless importantly related to various key self-
terms. Expanding on a point discussed above, one can
be efficiently processing information about the external
environment (“consciousness”) without knowing about it
(“self-awareness”). Numerous everyday complex actions are
properly accomplished without the agent being aware of
performing them (see Farthing, 1992), as when one drives back
home after work while thinking about something unrelated
to driving per se. Similarly, one can postulate that most non-
human animals are conscious but not self-aware (Morin,
2006). However, all self-related processes require consciousness
to be performed. That is, an unconscious organism cannot
possibly engage in self-reflection, prospection, ToM, etc.,
although it has been argued that some forms of mental activity
are preserved in the absence of consciousness (Owen et al.,
2006).
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TABLE 4 | Self-views (content and feelings about the self).
Term Related terms Definition
Self-concept • Self-image
• Self-definition
Global (although also situation-specific) perception/image of self; coherent, and organized set of
self-information acquired through self-awareness and social feedback/comparison; who one
thinks one is (L’Ecuyer, 1978; Marsh and Shavelson, 1985; Hornsey, 2008; Racy, 2015).
Self-esteem • Self-worth
• Self-feeling
• Self-respect
• Self-liking
• Self-judgement
Global emotional evaluation of the self; positive or negative attitude toward the self (Rosenberg,
1965; Greenwald et al., 2002).
Self-efficacy • Self-confidence
• Self-assurance
• Self-belief
Level of confidence of being able (or not) to perform a specific task successfully (Bandura,
1977; Alden, 1986).
Possible self • Ideal self
• Ought self
• Future self
Self-concept in the future; one’s idea of what one might become, would like to become, is
afraid of becoming (Markus and Nurius, 1986).
Self-discrepancy Self-incongruence Incongruence between real self and ideal/ought self (Rogers, 1961; Higgins, 1996).
Self-construal Different understanding of the self (e.g., dependent, independent) in different cultures (Markus
and Kitayama, 1991).
Self-categorization Self-perception as a group member possessing the same characteristics and reactions as other
group members (Abrams et al., 1990).
Self-conscious emotions Emotions that can only be experienced by self-aware creatures—e.g., guilt, shame,
embarrassment (Lewis and Ramsay, 2004).
Although “metacognition” involves self-attention and is
closely connected to other terms such as “self-awareness” and
“introspection”, one must keep in mind that it refers to attention
exclusively paid to one’s thoughts—private, unobservable self-
aspects. Metacognition thus excludes attention focused on any
other type of private self-aspects like emotions, goals, sensations,
memories, as well as public self-aspects such as appearance, tone
of voice, others’ opinion of oneself, etc. It is tempting to use
“mindfulness” and “self-reflection” interchangeably, but Carlson
(2013) sees subtle differences between these two constructs
(E. Carlson, personal communication, January 20, 2014). Both
mindfulness and self-reflection are considered healthy forms
of self-focus based on genuine curiosity about the self, but
mindfulness also involves “decentering” or distant observation
(a third-person perspective on the self), accepting what is
observed in a compassionate way, and non-attachment/reactivity.
Regarding ToM development, the most accepted proposal is the
Simulation view according to which one uses one’s knowledge
of one’s internal states in order to imagine (“simulate”) what it
could be like for others to experience comparable states (Gallup,
1985; Hesslow, 2002; Dimaggio et al., 2008; Focquaert et al.,
2008). This view suggests that self-awareness comes first and
that a disruption in self-awareness will negatively affect ToM—
a prediction at least partially supported by neuropsychological
observations (see Bivona et al., 2014). Although “autobiography”
and “prospection” refer to mental time travel in opposite
temporal directions—past and future respectively—, a large
body of research suggests that they are intimately linked.
Deficits in autobiographical access following brain injury or
dementia reliably result in prospection deficits; common brain
activations are observed when participants either engage in
autobiographical or prospection tasks (for a review see Szpunar
et al., 2016). This evidence supports the notion that the primary
function of episodic memory is to provide building blocks
from which episodic future thoughts are constructed. The
contents of episodic memory may be sampled and recombined
in various ways in the course of constructing a coherent mental
representation of novel future scenarios (Szpunar, 2010).
SELF-PROCESSES
Table 3 presents definitions (and related terms whenever
possible) of processes used by the self as an executive agent.
Executive functions represent a set of cognitive processes that are
involved in the control of behavior—selecting and successfully
monitoring behaviors that facilitate the attainment of chosen
goals. These functions include attentional control, inhibitory
control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility, as well as
reasoning, problem solving, and planning (Diamond, 2013).
It is safe to posit that most self-related processes heavily
rely on “self-talk” (Morin, 2005, in press; DeSouza et al., 2008;
Neuman and Nave, 2010; Turjman, 2016). That is, processes such
as self-reflection, self-rumination, self-evaluation, self-regulation,
and self-monitoring require an active verbal conversation with
oneself, e.g., “Why did I do that?”, “I should eat less carbs”,
“I look good in this outfit”. Indeed, several studies report
positive significant correlations between different measures of
inner speech and self-related constructs (e.g., Morin et al.,
1993; Brinthaupt et al., 2009). Inner speech loss leads to
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FIGURE 1 | Postulated relations between various self-related processes. Colors refer to the following categories: Blue = basic terms; Green = non-self-terms;
Red = self-processes; Yellow = self-views.
self-reflection impairment (Morin, 2009). And self-reflective
tasks such as deciding if personality traits describe oneself or not
significantly recruit the left inferior frontal gyrus, a brain area
associated with inner speech production (Morin and Hamper,
2012). Similarly, self-regulation requires self-awareness and self-
evaluation (Bandura, 1991): one needs to know what to change
about the self (“self-awareness”) in order to effectively modify it
(“self-regulation”).
There is no definitive consensus on this issue, but it is
common to view “self-regulation” as representing a complex
long-term process involving the attainment of numerous goals
and sub-goals, such as successfully graduating from university.
In contrast, “self-control” refers to a single short-term effort
at resisting temptation or delaying gratification, like studying
instead of watching a movie. As such, self-regulation is made
up of numerous instances of self-control. The person being
successful at both self-regulation and self-control is said to
possess “self-discipline”.
SELF-VIEWS
Table 4 depicts different types of content that the self is made
up of—thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and evaluations about the
self, produced by self-processes discussed in the previous section.
At the risk of oversimplifying, the self-concept represents a
global, emotionally flat, view that one has of oneself (Who am
I?), whereas self-esteem constitutes the emotional evaluation of
one’s self-concept (Do I like myself?). Note that self-esteem can
also be understood as a reaction to the self (sixth category)
in addition to a self-view (fourth category). Furthermore, it is
essential to recognize that self-concept and self-knowledge are
not interchangeable terms. The self-concept is a potentially, but
not necessarily, accurate image of the self; people often hold
unrealistic views of themselves as evidenced by the discrepancy
between self-ratings on personality inventories and ratings of
others who are close to the self (see Carlson, 2013). Self-
knowledge can be conceived of as accurate information about
the self—a realistic self-concept. As a level of confidence about
one’s future performance, self-efficacy evidently shapes one’s self-
esteem. Self-esteem represents an important predictor of life
outcomes, with a positive self-view being associated with better
health, occupational, financial, and relational consequences,
and vice-versa (Kuster et al., 2013). Self-esteem increases from
adolescence to middle adulthood, peaks at about age 50 to 60
years, and then decreases at an accelerating pace into old age
(Orth and Robins, 2014).
RELATIONS BETWEEN SELF-TERMS
Figure 1 shows numerous possible links between several key
terms defined in this paper. Its purpose is to go beyond
mere definition and classification by exploring how self-terms
conceptually may relate to one another. By “conceptually related”,
I mean how several key self-processes create additional self-
processes which themselves also lead to further self-processes,
and so on. This represents a preliminary effort and will
no doubt gain complexity and empirical support in the
future.
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Figure 1 reads as follows. A conscious organism is awake
and interacts with its environment in complex ways for survival
purposes; attention is directed outward. When the organism
directs attention inward it becomes the object of its own
attention—it becomes self-aware. This state creates a sense of
agency, an awareness that one is responsible for one’s actions in
the world. Self-awareness, in essence a form of communication
with oneself, is associated with a verbal and usually silent
conversation with oneself—self-talk. This inner voice may help
sustain self-reflection or self-rumination, or a combination of
both. Self-rumination represents a repetitive, uncontrollable, and
negative focus on the self which may lead to self-criticism,
self-doubt, and self-blame, and these in turn may feed back
into self-rumination and further aggravate the anxious self-
thinking, hence the bidirectional arrows connecting these last
self-terms. The individual may then resort to self-escape (e.g.,
watching television; Moskalenko and Heine, 2003) or ultimately
to self-destruction (e.g., addiction or suicide; Baumeister, 1991).
Alternatively, or simultaneously the person may engage in self-
enhancement and/or self-handicapping in order to make oneself
feel better about oneself (Strube and Roemmele, 1985). This
entire lower branch in Figure 1 is most probably associated with
low self-esteem, as shown on the extreme right portion.
Inner speech may also help sustain self-reflection, where
the person focuses on learning about and improving oneself.
This non-judgmental form of self-attention arguably represents
a prerequisite for the emergence of several key self-related
functions: ToM, self-description, self-evaluation, mental time
travel, and self-efficacy. Note that the unidirectional arrow
connecting autobiography to prospection reminds us that the
former serves as a springboard for the latter. The bidirectional
arrow linking self-efficacy and self-esteem suggests that one’s
confidence (or lack thereof) at performing well on various tasks
affects one’s evaluation of the self, and vice-versa. Self-description,
self-evaluation, and mental time travel all participate in the
gradual construction of a self-concept, the acquisition of self-
knowledge, the emergence of self-esteem, self-disclosure, and
self-regulation. Self-regulation involves self-monitoring as well as
self-presentation. Self-knowledge, self-concept, and self-esteem
form the basis of one’s sense of identity. This entire higher branch
in Figure 1 is most probably associated with high self-esteem, as
shown on the extreme right portion, and may lead to self-regard
and self-compassion.
CONCLUSION
An efficient scientific investigation of the self relies on the use
of clearly defined terms that describe its multiple underlying
operations and functions. One can unfortunately find many
examples in the literature of single self-terms being differently
defined; another problem consists in the use of different terms
to designate the same construct. A unified taxonomy of self-
related terms is currently lacking and the present paper offers
a preliminary framework in that direction. I propose that a
parsimonious yet inclusive classification system should include
basic terms related to the overall process of self-perception,
non-self-terms that are importantly associated to some other self-
terms, processes related to the executive self, and self-views. I
also look at how various self-terms may be related, suggesting for
instance that self-talk represents a fundamental cognitive activity
leading to two possible forms of self-focus, self-reflection and self-
rumination, themselves linked in complex ways to a host of other
positive (e.g., ToM) or dysfunctional (e.g., self-destruction) self-
processes. I view my proposed model both as a look-up table and
as a guide to the many ways in which one might experimentally
define and operationalize self-variables.
Several self-terms still need to be defined—in particular,
self-biases (e.g., self-deception, self-verification), reactions to
the self (e.g., self-regard, self-blame), and terms related to
the self ’s interpersonal style (selfish, self-righteous). One must
acknowledge that specific self-related terms may signify slightly
different things in various contexts, meaning that in the end
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to come to a complete
definitional consensus. But a tentative definition is more desirable
than no definition at all.
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